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I. INTRODUCTION 
Daniel E. Rauch and David Schleicher’s Like Uber, but for Local 
Government Law: The Future of Local Regulation of the Sharing Economy 
makes three predictions for how local governments will respond to the rise of 
the sharing economy.1 The first prediction is that local governments will begin 
to subsidize sharing economy uses, a subsidy that the authors controversially 
argue should be modeled after sports stadium subsidies.2 The second 
prediction is that local governments will seek to procure sharing economy 
services for low income residents that will be exacted from sharing firms at the 
issuance of permits and licenses to otherwise operate in the jurisdiction.3 The 
third prediction is that sharing economy uses will revolutionize government 
contracting and the way that local governments own property.4 
Two questions arise in considering these predictions: do the predictions 
have merit, and are there other predictions to make that are not captured by the 
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authors’ discussion? While the article’s title frames the authors’ predictions as 
focusing on the use of local government’s regulatory authority, the great merit 
of this article may be that it is not about traditional regulation at all: instead, it 
encourages cities to look beyond those police power constraints imposed on 
sharing firm’s business activities to think about how sharing economy uses can 
be harnessed to achieve urban policy objectives. As such, in responding to 
these three predictions, each will be re-envisioned within the context of the 
types of urban policy objectives they embody—economic development, 
redistribution, and propriety functions, respectively—in search of optimizing 
opportunities with sharing firms. After taking stock of each of these 
predictions, this response then offers several additional predictions for how 
local government can make the most of the sharing economy. 
II. DECENTRALIZED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Local government subsidies are typically justified as an impetus to 
economic development that would, but for the subsidy, go elsewhere.5 This is 
no small matter: by one account, over $80 billion in incentives is given to 
businesses by local governments each year.6 Is there a reason for local 
governments to subsidize sharing firms with this kind of largess? The answer 
is yes, but for reasons that are wholly opposite to those proffered by Rauch 
and Schleicher. 
Sharing firms offer local governments the opportunity to do something 
they have long sought but never been able to do well: coordinate a 
decentralized economic development strategy for both economic growth and 
infrastructure development. The centralized model of “city fathers” building 
up a city through large projects—convention centers, museums, and sports 
stadiums—along with the hotels and entertainment facilities to service them, 
has seldom gone well.7 In almost every city, these centralized economic 
development strategies have been rife with backroom dealing and graft.8 The 
land assembly for these massive structures often erased vibrant neighborhoods 
of minorities, with African-American and Chinese communities often taking 
the brunt of progress’s wrecking ball.9 The resulting projects have often been 
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bland and sanitized cityscapes that destroy fine-grained urban fabric and, 
worse, necessitate ongoing city subsidy or specialized taxation to keep them 
operating. All of this in the name of civic pride.10 This history of centralized 
economic development, while dubious from its beginning, survived because 
few cities have found viable alternatives. It is hard to see why Rauch and 
Schleicher would want to associate their proposed subsidies for sharing firms 
with this history. 
But sharing firms offer cities the chance to do something remarkable, and 
antithetical, to how economic development has long been practiced: 
decentralize economic development activity and its commensurate 
infrastructure in a manner that is fluid and responsive to market needs. Prior to 
sharing firms and their platform-based technologies, such decentralization of 
economic development policy was largely impossible. But pairing platform-
based services with other advances in data analysis and computing 
infrastructure, offers cities a new way forward.11 This fits the future of local 
government itself, which in a few short decades will almost certainly be more 
horizontally structured as opposed to the hierarchical, vertical structures of 
today.12 As cities seek to move towards networks of governance, sharing firms 
could lead the way in offering economic development opportunities beyond 
downtown, major corporations, and the city fathers. 
Here are several examples of sharing firm projects worthy of local 
government subsidy. First, cities have long failed to provide adequate 
transportation options to suburban commuters. Park-n-Rides beside highways 
often sit empty; van pools elicit a special kind of cultural anathema. On the 
other hand, the platform-based uberPOOL pairs individuals with common 
locations and destinations together and has already proven immensely popular 
at making ridesharing easy and, moreover, branded it in a way people will 
use.13 If widely implemented, such ridesharing platforms could dramatically 
reduce infrastructure costs, provide cheap transportation options in suburban 
areas for low income individuals, and assist with environmental emissions 
compliance. 
Second, cities have long failed to bring the financial benefits of economic 
development activity, such as conventions, to the neighborhoods. Short-term 
rentals, such as Airbnb,14 bring those visitors to parts of the city where visitors 
seeking authentic experiences are likely to shop at local stores and restaurants. 
Cities will need to resolve tensions inherent in bringing such commercial uses 
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to the neighborhoods; if they can do so, the economic impacts could be 
enormous. This could be especially true for marginal neighborhoods that 
exhibit the type of authentic experiences tourists often desire, but where the 
local population may not have sufficient density to otherwise support certain 
uses on their own. 
Third, cities should consider how sharing firms can assist in creating 
cultures of connectivity. As AnnaLee Saxenian noted in her classic study of 
Silicon Valley, a community that creates opportunities for connections 
provides itself a regional advantage over those locations that rely upon 
traditional, hierarchical forms of governance.15 Cities could encourage this 
kind of connectivity by “zoning in” sharing firm uses that provide alternative 
reasons to enter single-use, staid suburban locations such as office parks and 
single-family residential communities. Sharing firms that offer temporary use 
of offices at night or pop-up restaurants in a house on Saturdays present 
economic opportunities and a new serendipity of urban experience even far 
from the city’s core. 
Finally, local governments could consider subsidizing the infrastructure to 
access sharing firms. Many low income urban neighborhoods, as well as 
exurban and rural communities, continue to struggle with access to broadband 
Internet.16 Subsidies that brought such infrastructure to those low income 
communities would facilitate their participation in the market opportunities the 
sharing firms provide. 
Since it is decentralized economic activity that cities should subsidize with 
sharing firms, the authors’ stadium analogy seems to belie the very promise of 
sharing platforms. Even if that were not the case, stadium subsidies do not 
have many of the benefits that the authors suggest they do. To tackle a few, 
stadium projects seldom override “political sclerosis”17 and force local 
interests to get in line behind a major project. Take, for instance, the rise of the 
community benefits agreement (CBA) movement, which may be the most 
substantive new form of exaction to emerge in the last several decades.18 
CBAs trace their origins to the Staples Center stadium in Los Angeles, which 
resulted in numerous exactions to benefit the local community.19 In many 
cities, CBAs are now de rigueur for any stadium, as well as any other city-
subsidized project. Second, while stadiums can be sources of pride, a public 
                                                                                                                     
 15 See generally ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND 
COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994). 
 16 COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ISSUE BRIEF: MAPPING THE DIGITAL DIVIDE 4  
(July 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/wh_digital_divide_issue_brief.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZA6V-ETHB] (“[T]here is substantial within-city variation in Internet 
adoption, and this variation is strongly correlated with household income.”). 
 17 Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 1, at 947. 
 18 See generally Vicki Been, Community Benefits Agreements: A New Local 
Government Tool or Another Variation on the Exactions Theme?, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 5 
(2010). 
 19 Id. at 8–11. 
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good of sorts as the authors argue, that fandom can turn to ire quickly when a 
team decides to up and leave.20 For these reasons, most major cities now 
refuse to offer subsidies to sports stadiums; it is only those cities with faded 
luster and pride on the line—places like Cincinnati—that continue to pay such 
subsidies though often only under duress.21 
A reticence to embrace Rauch and Schleicher’s analogy to stadiums here 
may ultimately be an incidental gripe. The authors and I agree that cities 
should subsidize sharing firms: I simply argue that the subsidy should be to 
enhance decentralized economic development. Rather than reinforce the old 
ways of growing a city—one big downtown deal at a time—we should 
prioritize the busy entrepreneurialism of the distant quarters. Sharing firms 
help do that. 
III. DISRUPTIVE REDISTRIBUTION 
Sharing firms have, thus far, focused their attention on capturing the 
middle and high-ends of their respective markets. For instance, after Uber 
introduced its basic service, it introduced several levels of more upscale 
offerings—better cars, liveried services—that sought to capture the luxury end 
of the urban transportation market.22 
Rauch and Schleicher argue that cities will increasingly seek to exact 
services, or in lieu fees, for low income communities from sharing firms by 
conditioning access to the middle and higher ends of the market.23 Such 
exacted services for low income communities, they argue, could include 
“expanded operations in poorer areas, mandated discounts in such areas, or 
hiring advantages for workers from disadvantaged backgrounds.”24 The 
authors’ argument helpfully frames how the types of exactions and fees often 
required by local governments for other permits and licenses might apply to 
sharing firms.25 
The necessity of these exactions the authors foresee, however, may be 
significantly mitigated by factors not addressed by the article. First, it may be 
that existing laws already prohibit the failure to service low income and other 
vulnerable communities. For instance, in many cities, taxis cannot refuse to 
                                                                                                                     
 20 See, e.g., Bill Chappell, St. Louis Fans’ Ire, and Other Reactions to the Rams’ 
Move to LA, NPR (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/01/13/ 
462919835/st-louis-fans-ire-and-other-reactions-to-the-rams-move-to-l-a [https://perma.cc/ 
4MTZ-PC92]. 
 21 Reed Albergotti & Cameron McWhirter, A Stadium’s Costly Legacy Throws 
Taxpayers for a Loss, WALL STREET J. (July 12, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424052748704461304576216330349497852 [https://perma.cc/LQM2-734V]. 
 22 See UBER, https://www.uber.com/ [https://perma.cc/WK5E-5LRY] (describing 
multiple different services). 
 23 Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 1, at 954. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
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pick up a person because of the color of their skin or where they want to go; in 
New York City, a taxi driver was recently fined $25,000 for refusing to pick 
up a black family and then immediately picking up white customers.26 There is 
concern that many transportation network companies, such as Uber, are 
permitting drivers to discriminate in ways that are otherwise prohibited by 
taxis.27 Similarly, hotels are not permitted to discriminate among guests that 
seek to stay at a hotel;28 however, a recent study found that Airbnb hosts 
routinely discriminate against African-Americans in ways that would be illegal 
if done by hotels.29 It seems almost certain that civil rights laws will 
eventually apply to sharing firms and regulate this kind of discrimination 
without the need for an exaction to do so. 
Disability laws will also likely prove a means of providing a baseline 
service for low income and vulnerable communities. Cases involving blind 
individuals that were repeatedly denied rides on Uber are currently before 
courts alleging violations of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act, as 
well as state-specific disabilities laws.30 
Other constitutional equal protection claims could surface where disparate 
treatment of low income or vulnerable communities arise. In addition, labor 
laws may offer some protections to low income individuals in the sharing 
economy by classifying them as employees rather than independent 
contractors.31 In these ways, sharing firms’ failure to service low income 
neighborhoods may become mitigated through application of existing laws 
that would circumscribe the need for exactions. 
On the other hand, even if such claims proved victorious, low income 
communities will almost certainly continue to be underserved by sharing 
firms. Rauch and Schleicher argue that cities will most likely turn to 
                                                                                                                     
 26 Comm’n on Human Rights ex rel. Jordan v. Raza, No. 716/15, at 1, 3, 13 (N.Y.C. 
Office of Admin. Trials & Hearings July 27, 2015), http://archive.citylaw.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/17/oath/15_cases/15-716.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9GX-FA9G]. 
 27 Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 85, 95–98 
(2015) (discussing discrimination within the Uber platform, as well as other platform-based 
sharing firms). 
 28 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 243, 261–62 (1964) 
(finding a motel’s refusal to rent rooms to African-Americans violated Title II of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, which was a proper use of Congress’s power to regulate commerce). 
 29 See Benjamin Edelman et al., Racial Discrimination in the Sharing Economy: 
Evidence from a Field Experiment 1, 4 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 16-069, 
2016), http://www.benedelman.org/publications/airbnb-guest-discrimination-2016-01-06.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N2F4-NLBA] (“In a field experiment on Airbnb, we find that requests 
from guests with distinctively African-American names are roughly 16% less likely to be 
accepted than identical guests with distinctively White names.”). 
 30 See Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of Cal. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 103 F. Supp. 3d 1073, 
1077 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 31 See Berwick v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 11-46739, at 6–10 (Cal. Labor Comm’n  
June 3, 2015), http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1988& 
context=historical [https://perma.cc/SN4Y-TSUK] (holding Uber drivers are employees), 
appeal filed, No. CGC-15-546378 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 16, 2015). 
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traditional forms of exactions and in lieu fees. In some cases, that approach 
will be necessary. However, an alternative exists. Rather than cities seeking 
exactions, they could seek to grant eased access to this low end of the market, 
which is where disruptive innovation in markets begins. Clayton Christensen, 
who first gave form to disruption theory, recently summarized it as follows: 
“Disruption” describes a process whereby a smaller company with 
fewer resources is able to successfully challenge established 
incumbent businesses. Specifically, as incumbents focus on improving 
their products and services for their most demanding (and usually 
most profitable) customers, they exceed the needs of some segments 
and ignore the needs of others. Entrants that prove disruptive begin by 
successfully targeting those overlooked segments, gaining a foothold 
by delivering more-suitable functionality—frequently at a lower 
price.32 
Rather than seek exactions from sharing firms or city ownership of sharing 
technologies, cities are likely to have better results by encouraging market 
competition that prioritizes easy access to low income communities for market 
competitors. While these markets are often overlooked, businesses seeking an 
entry into a market otherwise dominated by an incumbent firm are well aware 
that the low end of the market is the way to “disrupt” the entire industry. Cities 
can facilitate service to their low income communities by making them more 
accessible to such disruptive innovators. 
To do this, cities need to ensure there is access to the Internet in low 
income communities. As noted previously, one way to do this would be to 
“hard-wire” broadband into these communities.33 A riskier, but perhaps more 
fruitful, approach might be for cities to take a page from the playbook of the 
developing world, where low income individuals access the Internet through 
low cost smartphones.34 A massive deployment of low cost smartphones to 
low income communities may invite competition for this large-but-low-margin 
market that would serve as the disruptive gateway for many innovators. 
Even where exactions are used, they could be directed towards providing 
conditions of market disruption where incumbent firms fail to take the market 
opportunity. For instance, local governments could consider revising their 
zoning and other permitting processes to integrate exactions that would ensure 
low income communities have access to sharing firms. Inclusionary housing 
mandates, which often require ten to fifteen percent of large multifamily 
                                                                                                                     
 32 Clayton M. Christensen et al., What Is Disruptive Innovation?, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(Dec. 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/12/what-is-disruptive-innovation [https://perma.cc/YT37-
S96Z]. 
33 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 34 See Sara Corbett, Can the Cellphone Help End Global Poverty?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. 
(Apr. 13, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/13/magazine/13anthropology-t.html 
[https://perma.cc/LDS3-PFH4]. 
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projects to meet affordability requirements, could also require that a certain 
number of cars from car-sharing services be located on-site.35 If the incumbent 
car-sharing firm does not wish to provide the car, the requirement provides an 
opening for a disruptor to seize the opportunity offered. 
Encouragement of such market competition through exactions to benefit 
low income communities, coupled with access to online services that would 
never otherwise locate in a low income community, would prove valuable in 
fighting the cultural and market isolation often faced by low income 
communities. 
IV. ON-DEMAND GOVERNANCE AND THE  
POST-TIEBOUTIAN CONSUMER VOTER 
Rauch and Schleicher convincingly argue that sharing firms will 
revolutionize the way that local governments own property. For instance, they 
note that local governments are increasingly giving up automobile fleets in 
favor of car-sharing services.36 New sharing firms now focus on helping local 
governments share expensive equipment used for a discrete period of time and 
for defined tasks—chipping roads, installing sewer pipes, snow ploughing, and 
the like.37 Sharing firms are even being deployed as part of emergency 
preparedness plans.38 
Where government benefits are a defined service offered for a discrete 
period of time, sharing firms have the potential to offer significant cost savings 
by permitting governments with staggered needs for such equipment to share 
the expenses of the equipment. Of course, many local governments already 
engage in forms of such sharing, typically in the form of intergovernmental 
agreements between cities within the same region or state.39 Sharing firms 
seem destined to make this trend explode, which could have a substantial 
benefit on local government budgets presuming that contracting and labor laws 
could be navigated to permit such sharing.40 
A more tenuous, but perhaps more profound question raised by the 
authors’ discussion of local governments’ proprietary functions is whether this 
type of procurement could ultimately lead to a post-Tieboutian world and the 
end of the consumer-voter. A hallmark of local government theory holds that, 
in choosing where to live, individuals act as “consumer-voters” that choose 
between local governments in a region on the basis of the jurisdictions’ 
relative mix of taxes and services. The theory of the consumer-voter was first 
                                                                                                                     
 35 See, e.g., Inclusionary Housing Program, S.F. MAYOR’S OFF. HOUSING & 
COMMUNITY DEV., http://sfmohcd.org/inclusionary-housing-program [https://perma.cc/ 
9KGM-VRTX]. 
 36 Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 1, at 960. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 961. 
 39 Id. at 959 n.316. 
 40 Id. at 962. 
Vol. 77] OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL FURTHERMORE 55 
posited by Charles Tiebout in his classic work, “A Pure Theory of Local 
Expenditures.”41 
Sharing firms could change the Tieboutian calculus if they increasingly 
permit local governments to offer more services on demand and without the 
sunk costs of purchasing infrastructure. Consider a scenario in which all local 
governments’ services fall to a baseline mandated by state statute. As a 
particular individual or community decides it wants a service, instead of 
moving to another jurisdiction like a consumer voter would in the Tieboutian 
model, that individual or community instead purchases the service for a fee 
through a municipal sharing firm. Pressed to its limits, the model of municipal 
governance Rauch and Schleicher propose could eliminate Tieboutian sorting; 
instead of the consumer voter moving—voting with the feet—the consumer 
voter purchases the service from a municipal sharing firm, but just for as long 
as the service is desired, while otherwise staying in place. 
In this digital age, cities have remained stubbornly tied to the feudal 
archaicisms of land and jurisdiction. It may be that sharing firms could deliver 
the on demand city, one increasingly freed of location. The outer limits of 
municipal sharing may ultimately be bounded by equity; the same types of 
equitable concerns that arise with fee-based provisions of government services 
could also arise in a sharing model. Subsidies to ameliorate such equitable 
concerns could be provided, though likely would not eliminate the equity 
issues altogether. 
V. OTHER PREDICTIONS 
In addition to Rauch and Schleicher’s three predictions, I would add 
several additional predictions for how local governments should engage with 
sharing firms in the near future. 
First, the sharing economy presents a number of new uses and services 
that do not fit within existing legal frameworks.42 These sharing firms cannot 
live in the liminal zone between legal and illegal forever; eventually, these 
sharing firms must be legalized under negotiated terms or otherwise face 
enforcement. Rauch and Schleicher chose not to address this aspect of local 
government’s response to sharing firms, but it remains central in the struggle 
local governments face right now. In fashioning a response, local governments 
will find that differing technologies require differentiated responses.43 
Nonetheless, local governments should contemplate an overarching, holistic 
approach to how it will respond to the new realities of platform-based 
technologies. This is a generational transformation, which presents an 
                                                                                                                     
 41 Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 
417 (1956). 
 42 See Stephen R. Miller, First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy,  
53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 3), http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2568016 [https://perma.cc/PVY6-WEWS]. 
 43 Id. (manuscript at 1). 
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opportunity to reevaluate why laws exist, take from them what should remain, 
and leave the rest behind. For instance, a community may decide that “gig” 
workers44 should have easier access to benefits, but may decide not to 
maintain licensing provisions for certain industries such workers frequent. 
Second, in conservative states, local governments interested in regulating 
sharing firms will face pressure from State legislatures that will seek to limit 
local regulation of such firms. For instance, when the Democratic-led 
government of Boise, Idaho tried to impose basic registration requirements on 
Uber drivers similar to those it imposed on taxi drivers, the Republican-led 
Idaho state government enacted a first-in-the-nation law preempting all local 
regulation of transportation network companies, such as Uber.45 Local 
governments, without regard to particular positions, will need to increasingly 
fight for the ability to regulate sharing firms, especially in states where sharing 
economy uses are valued by conservatives for their perceived ability to 
weaken labor and licensing standards. 
Third, local governments should give thought to how sharing firms might 
control future technologies. For instance, though seemingly the stuff of science 
fiction, the large-scale deployment of autonomous vehicles appears to be just 
several decades into the future.46 At that time, it may well be that all vehicles 
are shared through something similar to a car-sharing application like Uber, 
sans driver, or Zipcar.47 How does such a future change the infrastructure 
needs of a local government and what steps should be taken to prepare for 
such a dramatic change? Local governments should be contemplating such a 
future now. 
While the sharing economy remains a small part of the overall economy 
today,48 platform-based applications are here to stay and will certainly grow in 
unexpected ways. The power of such platforms is primarily in facilitating the 
mass decentralization of economic activity, which will, in turn, fundamentally 
affect infrastructure needs of communities and the physical spaces in which 
we live. The most profound effects of sharing firms on local governments will 
build exponentially over the next several decades in alliance with other 
technological advances like the processing of Big Data and the evolution of 
                                                                                                                     
 44 See Josh Zumbrun & Anna Louie Sussman, Proof of a ‘Gig Economy’ Revolution 
Is Hard to Find, WALL STREET J. (July 26, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/proof-of-a-
gig-economy-revolution-is-hard-to-find-1437932539 [https://perma.cc/UL84-RSNJ]. 
 45 H.B. 201, 63rd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2015) (adding IDAHO CODE § 49-3715). 
 46 Press Release, General Motors, GM and Lyft to Shape the Future of Mobility  
(Jan. 4, 2016), http://media.gm.com/media/us/en/gm/home.detail.html/content/Pages/news/ 
us/en/2016/Jan/0104-lyft.html [https://perma.cc/S9NY-P77N] (“General Motors and Lyft 
today announced a long-term strategic alliance to create an integrated network of on-
demand autonomous vehicles in the U.S. . . . ‘We see the future of personal mobility as 
connected, seamless and autonomous,’ said GM President Dan Ammann. ‘With GM and 
Lyft working together, we believe we can successfully implement this vision more 
rapidly.’”). 
 47 Zipcar, http://www.zipcar.com/ [https://perma.cc/2S5L-TVP6]. 
 48 Zumbrun & Sussman, supra note 44. 
Vol. 77] OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL FURTHERMORE 57 
the Internet of Things.49 Local governments should contemplate futures that 
seem like science fiction—autonomous vehicles, drones delivering packages, 
virtual city hall smart phone apps—and fashion governance that is more 
efficient, more responsive, and more equitable than ever before. 
                                                                                                                     
 49 ROOT, supra note 11, at 1–2. 
